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I. Introduction
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,1 the United States Supreme Court overruled a
finding that a religious baker had violated a state
antidiscrimination law when refusing to create a wedding cake for
a same-sex couple.2 The decision might seem to have been a
masterful resolution of an extremely difficult case because the
Court issued a narrow opinion that seemed to affirm free exercise
rights while at the same time affirming the right of same-sex
couples to marry.3 Yet, the opinion, along with the accompanying
 Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus,
Ohio.
1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2. See id. at 1748 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“If that freedom is to maintain
its vitality, reasoning like the Colorado Court of Appeals’ must be rejected.”).
3. See id. at 1747–48 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the right for
same-sex couples to marry had and will continue to conflict with individuals’ right
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concurrences and dissent, may well destabilize various settled
areas of constitutional law and, in any event, likely represents
shots across the bow with respect to a number of issues that will
make their way before the Court.
Part II of this Article discusses Masterpiece Cakeshop,
explaining some of the contradictory signals contained within it
and why this opinion may prove to be much more significant than
many commentators seem to appreciate. Part III discusses some of
the ways that the decision may modify First Amendment law and
may undermine antidiscrimination protections as a general
matter. The Article concludes that the Masterpiece Cakeshop
holding permitted the Court to put off for another day resolution
of some of the very thorny issues that may arise when sincere
religious convictions are in conflict with antidiscrimination laws.
Many of the implicit views and approaches contained within
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggest that future opinions will be at best
quite contentious and at worst insupportable as a matter of reason
or precedent.4
II. Masterpiece and Mixed Messaging
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow opinion that seems to affirm
free exercise rights while at the same time affirming the right of
same-sex couples to marry.5 Yet, the opinion has the potential to
help bring about significant changes in existing law—the bases for
these important deviations are found not in the holding itself but
in the factors that the Court implicitly endorses for consideration
and in the implicit roles that these factors should play in future
cases.6 While the Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion does not change

to freedom of speech and expression).
4. See infra Part IV (discussing potential dystopian results of the case).
5. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747–48 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that the Court’s previous decision granting same-sex couples the right to
marry has inevitably come into conflict with religious liberty).
6. See id. at 1723 (noting certain factors that might be different from a
refusal to sell a cake).
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current law, it nonetheless bodes poorly for a reasoned resolution
of the difficult issues such cases may present.
A. Background
When Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins asked Jack Phillips
about creating a cake to help them celebrate their wedding, he
refused, citing religious opposition to same-sex marriage.7 Phillips,
a devout Christian,8 believes that “creating a wedding cake for a
same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a
celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.”9
Craig and Mullins then filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips,
alleging that that the bakery had denied them “‘full and equal
service’ . . . because of their sexual orientation.”10
Colorado has an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in
places of public accommodation.11 The act defines “‘public
accommodation’ broadly to include any ‘place of business engaged
in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the
public,’ but excludes ‘a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place
that is principally used for religious purposes.’”12
An investigator found that Phillips had refused to make
wedding cakes for six other same-sex couples13 because “his
7. See id. at 1723 (“In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece
Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about ordering a cake for their
wedding reception. The shop's owner told the couple that he would not create a
cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex
marriages . . . .”).
8. See id. at 1724 (explaining that Phillips’s main goal in life is to be
obedient to Jesus Christ).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1725.
11. See COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24–34–601(2)(a) (2017)
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group,
because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital
status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
a place of public accommodation . . . .
12. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1725 (2018) (citing COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24–34–601(1)).
13. See id. at 1726 (“The investigation found that Phillips had declined to
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religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential customers
‘were doing something illegal’ at that time.”14 The investigator also
found that Phillips had refused to sell cupcakes to two lesbians who
were going to celebrate a commitment ceremony15 because the shop
“had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this
type of event.”16 Thus, the bakery represented itself as having a
policy of refusing to sell to those celebrating same-sex unions,
because of the bakery’s religious beliefs that such unions merited
disapprobation and, perhaps, because such unions were “illegal.”17
Craig and Mullins were doing something illegal only in the
sense that Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriage at that
time.18 It was not against Colorado law for the couple to go to
Massachusetts to marry and then to have a subsequent reception
in Denver,19 just as it was not illegal for the unnamed lesbian
couple to have a commitment ceremony in Colorado.20 Nonetheless,
Colorado, at that time, did have a constitutional provision barring
recognition of same-sex unions.21
It is not clear why the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court expressly
noted that such marriages were not recognized at the time that
Phillips refused to make the cake.22 The Court may have done so
sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples.”).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 1725–26 (describing that Phillips explained to multiple
potential customers that he could not sell cakes to them because their sexual
orientation and lifestyle was illegal and against his religious beliefs).
18. See id. at 1723 (“[T]he State of Colorado itself did not recognize [same-sex
marriages] at that time.”).
19. See id. at 1724 (“At that time, Colorado did not recognize same-sex
marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in Massachusetts and afterwards
to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver.”).
20. See id. at 1723 (noting that Colorado did not recognize same-sex
marriages).
21. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 (“Only a union of one man and
one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.”), held
unconstitutional by Brinkman v. Long, No. 2013-CV-032572, 2014 WL 7722910
(Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014).
22. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1721 (“His dilemma was
understandable in 2012, which was before Colorado recognized the validity of gay
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because Phillips implied that the state’s refusal to recognize such
unions played a role in his refusal23 or, perhaps, because the Court
believed that the state’s refusal to recognize same-sex unions
undercut the claim that Phillips was motivated by impermissible
animus and supported his belief that his refusal was not precluded
by law.24 Whether or not the existence of such a law would in fact
negate the presence of animus,25 same-sex marriage is now
recognized in Colorado and all of the other states,26 so this factor
would not operate in the same way if a bakery were to deny such
services now.
B. First Amendment Implications?
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court explained that the case
“presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at
least two principles.”27 The first of the named principles involved
“the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect
the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be,
married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or
services.”28 The second principle involved “the right of all persons
to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as

marriages . . . .”).
23. See id. at 1724 (“Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes
for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage,
and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize same-sex marriages.”
(emphasis added)).
24. See id. at 1728
Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in
Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not
unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he
understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that
expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs . . . .
25. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s
state constitutional amendment barring antidiscrimination protections on the
basis of sexual orientation because the amendment “seem[ed] inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
26. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (striking down
same-sex marriage bans as a violation of 14th Amendment guarantees).
27. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
28. Id.

968

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 963 (2019)

applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 Yet,
this was a somewhat misleading way to begin for at least two
distinct reasons: first, it was not even clear whether or how the
First Amendment was triggered in this case, and, second, because
the Court did not offer a helpful way to reconcile these principles
besides offering some factors that “might”30 be considered and
instead decided the case based on the unobjectionable principle
that those ultimately adjudicating rights must not be blinded by
hostility towards one of the parties.31
The First Amendment freedoms include speech and free
exercise of religion.32 Speech was arguably implicated in this case,
even though “few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake
might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected
speech.”33 If speech can be implicated in cake-making, then an
important issue involves how to determine when cake-making
qualifies as protected speech. The Court noted that the general
failure to appreciate the possible speech elements of cake-making
might be attributable to the failure to appreciate that “the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen
our understanding of their meaning,”34 but did little to flesh out
the conditions under which the creation of baked goods would
trigger First Amendment scrutiny.35
Certainly, our understanding of constitutional protections
may evolve across generations—“[T]imes can blind us to certain
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 1732
Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full
and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert
it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented,
considered, and decided . . . . [T]he rulings of the Commission and of
the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be
invalidated.
32. See id. at 1723 (“The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of
speech and the free exercise of religion.”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. (stating factors that “might” be different from refusal to sell a
cake with no further explanation).
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truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”36 Yet, it is also
true that some “new” contexts may in fact be less novel than
initially thought and may well be readily analyzed in light of well
accepted principles and criteria.37 Regrettably, the Court did not
make clear or even mention whether this “new” understanding of
what constitutes political speech was compatible with Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,38 although that
case was addressed in Justice Thomas’ concurrence.39
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court illustrated how thorny some
of the implicated constitutional issues might be in a case involving
a baker who claimed that he could not in good conscience bake a
particular cake40—the Court mentioned several different scenarios
and then suggested that certain salient features might make a
constitutional difference.41 “If a baker refused to design a special
cake with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance,
a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be
different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.”42 This example was
offered in the context of explaining that “[i]n defining whether a
baker’s creation can be protected, these details might make a
difference.”43
Regrettably, it is not entirely clear which details of the Court’s
example might make a difference. Is it that the baker does not
want to design a special cake with celebratory words or images or
36. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
37. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The
decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow
closely on well-accepted principles and criteria.”).
38. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
39. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1744 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] reasonable observer would not
view Phillips’ conduct as ‘an endorsement of same-sex marriage,’ but rather as
mere ‘compliance’ with Colorado’s public-accommodations law.” (citing Rumsfeld,
547 U.S. at 64–65)).
40. See id. at 1723 (“The shop’s owner told the couple that he would not
create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex
marriage . . . .”).
41. See id. (noting a scenario that “might be different from a refusal to sell
any cake at all.” (emphasis added)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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is it simply that the baker does not have to design a special cake?
Does it matter that the special cake would be celebrating a
marriage? Perhaps the baker’s being asked “to use his artistic
skills to make an expressive statement”44 sufficed to trigger First
Amendment guarantees. The Court made the proper analysis even
more confusing when illustrating its speech point by talking about
words with religious meaning, as if those words might trigger more
speech protection than other non-religious words that Phillips
would refuse to endorse. 45
Ironically, after mentioning particular factors that might be
constitutionally relevant,46 the Court implied that some of those
very factors were not constitutionally relevant.47 Apparently, the
fact that Phillips was being asked to bake a cake did not alone
immunize his refusal, since the articulated factors might make a
difference when deciding whether a baker’s “creation” is
protected.48 But if the presence or absence of additional factors
would determine whether a creation was protected,49 then the
mere fact that it was being commissioned or created would not
alone immunize a refusal to bake a cake from prosecution under
an antidiscrimination law.
The Court’s mixed messaging was not limited to its discussion
of which factors might make a difference. The Court seemed to
undercut its own implicit position about how to analyze these

44. Id. at 1728.
45. See id. at 1723 (noting that refusal to design a cake showing words with
religious meaning might be different from Phillips’s instance).
46. See id. at 1723
A baker’s refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut
the right way, or refusal to put certain religious words or decoration on
the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the
public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it
are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless.
47. See id. (stating that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s
consideration of the case was faulty because “[t]he reason and motive for the
baker’s refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions”).
48. See id. (“In defining whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these
details might make a difference.”).
49. See id. (noting that the presence of certain factors might distinguish
future cases).
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kinds of cases when one considers the Court’s reasoning in light of
the underlying facts.
Phillips had refused to bake a cake when he understood what
Craig and Mullins were celebrating50—there had been no
exploration of what would be on the cake,51 which means that none
of the possibly significant factors such as celebratory words or
images52 played a role in this case. Further, there is reason to
believe that Phillips would have been unwilling to provide any
kind of cake, e.g., a large sheet cake, for the celebration of Craig
and Mullins’s marriage, “because the shop ‘had a policy of not
selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.’”53
The Court noted Phillips’s admission that “if a baker refused
to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings, . . . the State would
have a strong case under this Court’s precedents that this would
be a denial of goods and services that went beyond any protected
rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the general
public.”54 Yet, the bakery did have such a policy,55 so it would seem
that Phillips admitted that the State had a strong case that
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s practices were in violation of Colorado
law.
A case involving a bakery with a blanket policy against
providing baked goods for same-sex weddings might be contrasted
with a narrower case involving a baker who refuses to provide a
specially designed cake “us[ing] his artistic skills to make an
expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and
of his own creation.”56 The Court’s having mentioned these
differing scenarios implicitly distinguishes between an
50. See id. (explaining that Phillips refused to bake the case when he learned
it was for a same-sex wedding).
51. See id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Craig and Mullins simply
requested a wedding cake: They mentioned no message or anything else
distinguishing the cake they wanted to buy from any other wedding cake Phillips
would have sold.”).
52. See id. at 1723 (noting potentially distinguishable factors of a refusal to
attend the wedding to cut the cake, lace religious words on the cake, or sell an
already created cake displaying religious symbols).
53. Id. at 1725.
54. Id. at 1728.
55. See id. at 1726 (noting that the shop “had a policy of not selling baked
goods to same-sex couples for this type of event”).
56. Id. at 1728.
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impermissible refusal to provide any goods or cakes with a possibly
permissible refusal to make an expressive statement with which
one disagrees.
Assume for purposes of illustration that the following
accurately represents current law. The Constitution protects
Baker’s conscience-based refusal to create a wedding cake that
includes the writing: “God blesses the union of Charles and David.”
However, a blanket refusal to bake any cake for a same-sex union
is not constitutionally protected.
Charles and David approach Baker seeking a cake with “God
blesses the union of Charles and David” written on it. Baker
refuses pursuant to the bakery’s general policy of refusing to
provide any baked goods for same-sex unions. At least one question
would be whether Baker’s refusal would be permissible because a
different baker would be constitutionally protected in refusing to
provide such a cake, given her willingness to provide other baked
goods for Charles and David; for example, a wedding cake with no
writing on it, or whether instead Baker’s refusal would not be
constitutionally protected because pursuant to a policy of refusing
to provide any baked goods for same-sex weddings.
In the hypothesized example where Charles and David supply
the words that they would like Baker to incorporate, it is unclear
whether this counts as an example of a refusal to “use his artistic
skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in
his own voice and of his own creation.”57 The words would not be
Baker’s, but the design of the cake would be and, further, Baker
would be using his own artistic skills to make the cake. It is simply
unclear whether this should count as Baker’s expressive
statement—if a baker is asked to design a cake with the words,
“Happy Birthday, Grandma,” those seeing the cake would be
unlikely to attribute the message to the baker rather than to
family members.58 Perhaps Baker’s being asked to write someone
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Cf. Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious
Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237, 243 n.27 (2016)
(“Whatever communicative content is found in ‘happy birthday’ in frosting is quite
obviously attributable to the person who bought and gave the cake, not to the
baker . . . .”).
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else’s words would nonetheless count as a wedding endorsement in
his own voice. Suppose, however, that Charles and David request
a wedding cake with no symbols or writing—that, presumably,
would be less likely to qualify as an endorsement in Baker’s own
voice.
There are numerous ways to modify the hypothetical about
Charles and David’s wedding cake to tease out the (possibly)
relevant point along the continuum past the blanket refusal to
create baked goods for a same-sex wedding where the refusal
would be constitutionally protected. However, regardless of where
that point along the continuum might be, the Court implied that a
baker would not be protected merely because he, himself, believed
that “creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding [regardless
of what letters or symbols it contained] would be equivalent to
participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own most
deeply held beliefs.”59
It may be that the Court did not believe that the Masterpiece
Cakeshop had a blanket policy of refusing to provide baked goods
for same-sex unions statement to that effect notwithstanding,60
because Phillips had told Mullins and Craig, “I’ll make your
birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just
don’t make cakes for same-sex weddings.”61 Phillips’s comment
when taken in light of the articulated refusal to provide baked
goods for same-sex unions “reads more naturally”62 as a suggestion
that Craig and Mullins should come back when they want baked
goods for a different occasion.63 But it is not at all clear why the
bakery’s willingness to provide baked goods for another occasion
would be relevant to whether their refusal to provide baked goods
59. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1728 (2018).
60. See id. at 1726 (noting that the shop had a policy of not selling to
same-sex couples).
61. Id. at 1724.
62. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012).
63. Presumably, the bakery’s willingness to provide cakes for a shower
referred to a baby shower. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (explaining
Phillips’s offer to make the couple “shower cakes”). If the bakery was unwilling to
provide baked goods for a commitment ceremony, it was likely unwilling to
provide a cake for a bridal shower or grooms cake, although these possibilities
were not discussed in the opinion. See id. (stating that Phillips “just [doesn’t]
make cakes for same sex weddings”).
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to Mullins and Craig for their wedding was in violation of law.
Nonetheless, the Court took issue with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission for its conclusion that the bakery’s willingness to
provide Craig and Mullins a birthday cake was somehow
irrelevant.64
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court seemed to be trying to find
some kind of compromise position. The Court noted that “[w]hen it
comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the clergy
who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could
not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or
her right to the free exercise of religion.”65 Such a “refusal would
be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of
religion.”66 However, the Court cautioned that
[I]f that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons
who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings
might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a
community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and
dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods,
services, and public accommodations.67

In a case addressing a baker’s conscience-based refusal on the
merits,
any decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently
constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object
to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be
allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold
if they will be used for gay marriages,’ something that would
impose a serious stigma on gay persons.68

Regrettably, the Court did not provide a helpful way to limit
the exemption claims that might be made by any number of
commercial entities, besides offering the bald statement that
“there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one
64. See id. at 1730 (“[T]he Commission dismissed Phillips’ willingness to sell
‘birthday cakes, shower cakes, [and] cookies and brownies,’ . . . to gay and lesbian
customers as irrelevant.”).
65. Id. at 1727.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1728–29.
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could argue implicate the First Amendment.”69 Ironically, the
Court offered a way for almost anyone to argue that the First
Amendment was triggered by their refusal to provide goods or
services for a same-sex wedding.70
The Court mentioned Phillips’s claim that he was being asked
“to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a
wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation,”71
which Phillips alleged was in effect “a demand for him to exercise
the right of his own personal expression for their message, a
message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious
beliefs.”72 But many different types of individuals commissioned to
perform a service requiring some kind of skill might claim, even
sincerely, that they were being asked to use their creative talents
to provide services for a wedding in a way that would be
inconsistent with their religious beliefs73—the Court offered
nothing to limit the “purveyors of goods and services who object to
gay marriages for moral and religious reasons . . . [who must] be
allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if
they will be used for gay marriages.’”74
Nor did the Court’s suggestive comments75 imply that the
envisioned exception would only apply to those providing
commissioned services. Suppose that a bakery makes several cakes
each morning with the expression, “May God’s countenance shine
upon you,”76 because the bakery has enough demand for such cakes
69. Id. at 1728.
70. See id. (determining that Phillips was not required to use his personal
expression to spread a message inconsistent with his religious beliefs).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013)
(discussing that a photographer refused to provides service for a couple
celebrating a same-sex union); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 549
(Wash. 2017) (stating that a florist refused to provide floral arrangement for a
same-sex union), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
74. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1728–29 (2018).
75. See id. at 1728 (refusing to demand that Phillips use his right to
expression to promote a belief he does not hold).
76. See id. at 1723 (offering the example of a baker who refuses “to sell a
cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious
words or symbols on it”).
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that it does not need to wait for special orders. Suppose further
that the bakery has a policy of refusing to sell such cakes to those
celebrating same-sex unions or, perhaps, to those in same-sex
relationships. It is simply unclear whether the Court would
consider this religious message to be a factor in favor of those
asserting a conscientious objection when refusing a sale, even
though the cake had not been specially ordered. Nor is it clear that
this exception would be limited to those in same-sex relationships.
Those with conscientious objections to interracial unions or
interreligious unions would presumably be entitled to invoke the
same kind of exception.77
Suppose that the cakes do not have religious writing or
symbols on them. Even so, the baker might believe that her selling
cakes (or other baked goods) to be used at a celebration of a
disfavored union would be incompatible with her religious beliefs.
While the Court suggested that such a refusal would be contrary
to law,78 the Court offered no way to distinguish between this
sincere refusal to allow baked goods to be used in a disapproved
celebration and the sincere religious claim of the individual who
did not want her artistic skills to be used on a way contrary to
conscience.
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggested that it could not sell baked
goods to those celebrating same-sex unions79 because doing so
would somehow make the bakery a participant in a celebration in
violation of conscience. Individuals who disapprove of a variety of
kinds of families or groups (whether defined in terms of sex, race,
religion, national origin, or some other category) might
analogously suggest that their promotion of those families/groups
in a variety of contexts would be a violation of conscience. Perhaps
77. Cf. Mark Strasser, Public Policy, Same-Sex Marriage, and Exemptions
for Matters of Conscience, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 135, 145 (2010) (noting that
individuals “might have religious qualms about helping any number of couples
marry, such as interracial, interreligious, or intergenerational couples,” and
others “might have religious objections to facilitating marriages where the parties
could not produce children through their union”).
78. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (distinguishing certain
instances of refusing to bake or sell cakes bearing religious symbols).
79. See id. at 1726 (noting that the bakery had a policy of refusing to sell to
same-sex couples).
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some of those claims could be rejected because the beliefs were not
sincerely held,80 but many individuals might in fact sincerely hold
such beliefs. If the Court stands by its claim that “it is a general
rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other
actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicable public accommodations law,”81 then the Court will have
to do much more to limit the conditions under which individuals
who refuse to serve particular families or groups because of
religious beliefs are immunized from prosecution under
antidiscrimination laws.82 Otherwise, the exception (namely,
whenever an individual has sincere religious compunctions about
providing the good or service)83 would swallow the rule.
C. Decisionmaker Bias
After suggesting a variety of factors that might be considered
in some future case implicating conscience and the appropriate
application of an antidiscrimination law,84 the Masterpiece
Cakeshop Court made clear that it would not address how these
factors should be applied.85 Instead, the Court focused on whether
the Commission had possessed the “requisite religious neutrality
that must be strictly observed”86 when assessing whether Phillips
had indeed violated the Colorado antidiscrimination law.
Several factors convinced the Court that Phillips’s claims had
not been examined with the required neutrality.87 Commission
80. But see id. at 1729 (criticizing the commissioner for implying that a
particular religious belief might not have been sincerely held).
81. Id. at 1727.
82. See id. at 1723 (providing a range of scenarios that might allow
immunization from prosecution).
83. See id. at 1732 (noting that disputes must be resolved with tolerance and
without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs).
84. See id. at 1723 (distinguishing situations involving cakes with religious
symbols that “might” be different).
85. See id. at 1732 (“However later cases raising these or similar concerns
are resolved in the future . . . .”).
86. Id.
87. See id. (stating that the State’s interest could have been weighed against
Phillips’s sincere religious belief in a way consistent with religious neutrality).
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members had, in the Court’s view, “endorsed the view that
religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public
sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and
persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business
community.”88 One Commission member in particular had
suggested that “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but
cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in
the state.’”89
The Court understood that the comments were ambiguous and
that the commissioner might merely have meant that “a business
cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation,
regardless of the proprietor’s personal views.”90 Or, the comments
“might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing
lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the
dilemma he faced.”91
Perhaps the commissioners were biased against Phillips.92
However, the Court’s claim that the Commission members did not
manifest “due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and
the dilemma he faced”93 was not entirely persuasive. It is an open
question whether Phillips had a free exercise right to refuse to
provide a cake in the circumstances, so it is at best an open
question whether any free exercise rights were ignored or
undervalued. Indeed, the free exercise right that the Masterpiece
Cakeshop Court seems to be recognizing is the right to have one’s
claim heard by a neutral decisionmaker94 and to have decisions
88. Id. at 1729.
89. Id.
90. Id. (“Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different
interpretations.”).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[S]tate actors cannot show
hostility to religious views; rather, they must give those views ‘neutral and
respectful consideration.’ . . . I join the Court's opinion in full because I believe
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that obligation.”).
93. Id. at 1729.
94. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975)
[A] “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”
This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to
courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally
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about one’s rights not be based on improper considerations such as
bias against one’s religion.95 But the question at hand is whether
in fact the Commissioners had been motivated by bias in reaching
the decision rather than in having come to an adverse decision on
appropriate grounds.96
What of the dilemma Phillips faced? Nothing is included
within the opinion that suggests that Phillips was conflicted—he
believed he had a religious duty to refuse to provide the baked
goods and may in addition have believed that such a decision was
in accord with the law because Colorado at the time did not
recognize same-sex unions.97 It simply is not clear what dilemma
the Court was envisioning.
A dilemma might be posed when religious dictates require one
action and the law requires another, but that dilemma did not
seem to be present at the time this occurred.98 Perhaps the
dilemma posed is that religious dictates might later be found to be
in violation of law, although that kind of dilemma is posed
whenever one does what one believes right (for religious or
non-religious reasons) and that decision is subsequently found to
be in violation of law.
Depending upon how Phillips’s beliefs were construed, the
commissioner might merely have been offering the view that
Phillips himself seemed to have conceded, namely, that Colorado
law precluded Phillips from issuing a blanket refusal to sell any

unacceptable but “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness.” In pursuit of this end, various
situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
(citations omitted).
95. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1731 (2018) (“[T]he government, if it is to respect the Constitution's
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the
religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”).
96. See id. (“[T]he Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause
to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”).
97. See id. at 1723 (explaining that the motivation for Phillips’s refusal was
based on his “sincere religious beliefs and convictions”).
98. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text (noting that Phillips
believed the wedding illegal).
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baked goods to those wishing to celebrate a same-sex union.99 Yet,
the questionable commissioner comments were not limited to those
already mentioned, and it may well be that some of the other
comments ultimately convinced the Court that the Commission
members were biased.
The Court seemed especially affronted100 by the following
remarks:
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean,
we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of
religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is
one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use
to—to use their religion to hurt others.101

It is not clear whether the Court rejected that religious views
had been used throughout history to justify discrimination102 or
whether, instead, the Court believed that religious views had been
used to justify discrimination103 but that those uses of religion were
99. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728
Petitioners conceded, moreover, that if a baker refused to sell any goods
or any cakes for gay weddings, . . . the State would have a strong case
under this Court's precedents that this would be a denial of goods and
services that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who offers
goods and services to the general public and is subject to a neutrally
applied and generally applicable public accommodations law.
100. See id. at 1729 (“To describe a man's faith as ‘one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two
distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as
merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”).
101. Id.
102. See, for example, the Loving Court’s description of the views of the trial
court judge:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red,
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mix.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
103. See Michael Kavey, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment
Right to Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 773 n.150 (2003) (“[R]eligion has been
used to justify discrimination in all forms.”).
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not appropriately compared to the use of religion before the
commission. The Court noted: “The commissioner even went so far
as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious
beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.”104 Such a
comment suggests that religion has sometimes been used to justify
indefensible practices but that it is unfair or inappropriate to
analogize the refusal to provide baked goods to practices involving
slavery and genocide.105
The commissioner may not have meant that the practice
before the Commission was of the same magnitude as slavery and
genocide but merely that religious beliefs had been used to justify
a whole host of discriminatory practices. The commissioner said as
much when suggesting that there were “hundreds of situations
where freedom of religion has been used to justify
discrimination.”106
Suppose that the commissioner had not mentioned slavery or
the Holocaust but instead had noted that religion had been used in
the past to justify the refusal to recognize interracial marriage.107
Presumably, such a comment would not trigger images of the
horrors of slavery or of gas chambers. However, given the broader
societal acceptance of interracial marriage,108 such a comment
might still have been thought prejudicial if, for example,
interracial marriage were thought religiously acceptable and
same-sex marriage religiously unacceptable.
The Court responded to the observation that religion had been
used to justify discrimination including slavery and the Holocaust
by saying: “This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission
charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral
104. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
105. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Three Concepts of Roles, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
547, 571 (2011) (“It does not help to compare some present injustice with some
historical norms that we now universally acknowledge as an evil, like slavery.”).
106. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
107. Cf. Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of
Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 263
(2002)
(“Opponents
of
mixed-race
marriages,
like
opponents
of same-sex marriages today, cited religion and natural law to block acceptance
of those relationships.”).
108. See Kevin Brown, The Enduring Integration School Desegregation
Helped to Produce, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2017) (“American society’s
acceptance of interracial dating and marriage has increased significantly.”).
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enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law that
protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well as
sexual orientation.”109 But the Court’s response here suggests that
the difficulty may not have been in comparing the horrors of
slavery or of the Holocaust to the indignity of having to go to a
different bakery to get baked goods for one’s wedding celebration,
but in a commissioner’s having the sentiment that religion may
have played a role in promoting slavery or the Holocaust. But
religion has been used to promote slavery,110 although it has been
used to undermine slavery as well.111 Religion also was used to
promote the Holocaust,112 although religion may also have inspired
individuals to oppose the Holocaust.113
Part of the difficulty for the Court was in determining whether
the commissioner(s) had an anti-religious bias that caused them to
find Phillips in violation of Colorado law or whether, instead, the
commissioners had reached that conclusion based on appropriate
considerations. Perhaps the Court is suggesting that a
commissioner’s having the sentiment that religion has sometimes
played a negative role in history should be a basis for recusal,
109. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1729 (2018)
110. See Marsha B. Freeman, Holier Than You and Me: ‘Religious Liberty’ Is
the New Bully Pulpit and Its New Meaning Is Endangering Our Way of Life, 69
ARK. L. REV. 881, 895 (2017) (noting that “[r]eligion . . . [was] traditionally used
to justify such abhorrent social platforms as slavery”).
111. See Alfred L. Brophy, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Critique of Slave Law in
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 12 J.L.& RELIGION 457, 504 (1995) (discussing “antislavery
evangelical religion”).
112. Cf. Jocelyn Hellig, Antisemitism in Sub-Saharan Africa with a Focus on
South Africa, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1197, 1202 (2000) (“The Holocaust of the
Second World War was thus ‘the terminal expression of Christian
anti-Semitism.’” (quoting RICHARD L. RUBENSTEIN, AFTER AUSCHWITZ: RADICAL
THEOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY JUDAISM 20 (1966))).
113. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury—A
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 42
(1986)
During World War II, Jewish people fleeing the holocaust found refuge
in monasteries where they were given food, shelter, and protective
identification. One Protestant parish in Southern France, Le
Chambon, declared itself a sanctuary and is credited with saving the
lives of over three thousand Jewish people who found shelter there.
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although one would wonder whether a commissioner who had the
sentiment that religion has sometimes played a very positive role
in history should also be a basis for recusal.114
The commissioner’s comment that “it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their
religion to hurt others”115 received a sharp rebuke from the
Court.116 It was not clear whether the term “rhetoric” was used to
suggest that the belief was “insincere.” 117 Nor was it clear whether
the use of “despicable” was intended to communicate that the
religious beliefs themselves were despicable. Perhaps the
commissioner was expressing his frustration because he believed
that religion was in this case resulting in harm118 when it often has
beneficial effects,119 although use of the term “despicable” would
not inspire public confidence in the commissioner’s objectivity.120
In any event, as someone adjudicating rights, the commissioner
simply should not be announcing that particular religious beliefs
are good or bad, right or wrong.121
The Court noted that the other commissioners did not object
to those comments.122 Based on that failure to object, the Court
114. Cf.
Masterpiece
Cakeshop,
138
S.
Ct.
at
1729
(“The
neutral . . . consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here.”).
115. Id.
116. See id. (“To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct
ways . . . .”).
117. Id.
118. Cf. Molly A. Gerratt, Closing A Loophole: Headley v. Church of
Scientology International as an Argument for Placing Limits on the Ministerial
Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 141, 182 (2011)
(“[A] religion can cause harm to its own adherents or third parties . . . .”).
119. Cf. William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 386–87 (1996) (“[R]eligion is one of the
most positive influences in society.”).
120. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1729 (2018) (suggesting that the commissioner’s comments reflected “a
clear and impermissible hostility”).
121. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory
Religious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259, 261 (1982) (“A few churches
conscientiously believe that God commands racial discrimination . . . . But such
churches are protected in their beliefs; the free exercise clause protects unpopular
churches as well as popular ones.”).
122. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (“The record shows no objection
to these comments from other commissioners.”).
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either attributed the same views to the Commission more
generally or at least believed that the fairness and impartiality of
the Commission was thereby seriously impugned.123 Needless to
say, the Court has not always believed that an asserted view, if
uncorrected by others, might reasonably be thought to reflect
animus on the part of those making the assertion and those not
complaining about it.124
Members of civil rights commissions are on notice that such
pronouncements will not be tolerated, and that they should not
make comments that would create an appearance (or reflect an
actuality) of partiality, especially in the context of rendering a
decision.125 But the Court offered additional evidence of alleged
partiality.
After the administrative law judge (ALJ) had ruled in favor of
Craig and Mullins, William Jack approached three different
bakeries126 and asked them to make cakes with messages
123. See id. at 1730 (“[T]he Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these
statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s
adjudication of Phillips’ case.”).
124. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (“To hold that
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”).Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191
(suggesting that there is “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other”), with
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”).The Court’s apparent
willingness to condone orientation animus did not go unnoticed. See Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1453 (9th Cir.), superseded, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), withdrawn on reh’g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (“The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court’s
willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the government,
are clear.”).
125. Cf. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So.
2d 1006 (Miss. 2004) (refusing to sanction a judge who had expressed his views
on the rights of gays and lesbians). The judge suggested that “homosexuals belong
in mental institutions.” See id. at 1008. The court suggested that after this public
pronouncement the judge might well face recusal motions. See id. at 1015 (“Judge
Wilkerson will doubtless face a recusal motion from every gay and lesbian citizen
who visits his court.”).
126. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“On March 13, 2014—approximately three months after the ALJ ruled in favor
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conveying disapproval of same-sex unions.127 Justice Ginsburg
explained in her dissent:
He requested two cakes “made to resemble an open Bible. He
also requested that each cake be decorated with Biblical verses.
[He] requested that one of the cakes include an image of two
groomsmen, holding hands, with a red ‘X’ over the image. On
one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] . . . ‘God hates sin. Psalm
45:7’ and on the opposite side of the cake ‘Homosexuality is a
detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second cake, [the one]
with the image of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack]
requested [these words]: ‘God loves sinners’ and on the other
side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Romans
5:8.’”128

The bakers refused to make the cakes. Jack filed a complaint
with the Civil Rights Commission and the Commission sided with
the bakers.129 The Commission justified its decisions by noting that
“the requested cake included ‘wording and images [the baker]
deemed derogatory,’ featured ‘language and images [the baker]
deemed hateful,’ or displayed a message the baker ‘deemed as
discriminatory.’”130
The Court believed that the Commission’s treatment of the
bakers refusing Jack’s request provided a sharp contrast with the
commission’s treatment of Phillips,131 and that the Commission’s
siding with the bakers in Jack’s case was “[a]nother indication of
hostility.”132 For example, the Court noted that the “Commission
ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message the
requested wedding cake would carry would be attributed to the
of the same-sex couple, Craig and Mullins, and two months before the
Commission heard Phillips’ appeal from that decision—William Jack visited three
Colorado bakeries.”).
127. See id. at 1730 (“[O]n at least three other occasions the Civil Rights
Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that
conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text.”).
128. Id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
129. See id. at 1730 (“Each time, the Division found that the baker acted
lawfully in refusing service.”).
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. See id. (“The treatment of the conscience-based objections at issue in
these three cases contrasts with the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’
objection.”).
132. Id. at 1730.
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customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this
point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting
anti-gay marriage symbolism.”133
Regrettably, the Court did not spell out what the Commission
was doing or why the Court found it objectionable. When ruling
against Phillips, the Commission had said that the message on the
cake, if any, would be attributed to those who bought the cake
rather than the baker.134 For example, if the cake had said,
“Congratulations,” “Best Wishes,” or “Health and Happiness,”
those seeing the cake would not think that Phillips was saying this
but, instead, that the customer had commissioned it, perhaps
assuming that those attending the wedding or reception had these
positive thoughts in mind. If the cake did not have any words or
symbols on it, the cake’s message of celebration would be
attributed to those attending the wedding rather than to Phillips.
The Commission’s identification of the individuals to whom the
message would be attributed was likely in response to the (actual
or anticipated) claim that Phillips did not want attributed to him
these good wishes for the couple, because he did not approve of
same-sex unions.135
The Commission did not tell the bakers who refused to bake
the cakes for Jack that the message of the cakes would not be
attributed to them but, instead, to Jack. Yet, the bakers did not
justify their refusal by saying that they feared that the message on
the cake would be attributed to them but, instead, defended their
refusals by saying that the message on the cake was “derogatory,”
“hateful,” or “discriminatory.”136 But if the bakers refusing to bake
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that the Commission denied
Mr. Phillips the choice of withholding his approval of the message the cake would
send).
135. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“This
Court’s compelled-speech doctrine forbids the Commission from demanding that
artists design custom expression that conveys ideas they deem objectionable.”).
136. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1730 (2018) (citations omitted). It might be noted that Phillips claimed that
he would refuse to make a cake that was derogatory to gays and lesbians. See id.
at 1745 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Phillips also refuses to bake cakes containing .
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Jack’s cakes were not basing their refusals on their right not to be
forced to send a message of which they disapproved but instead on
their right not to create something offensive, then the Commission
would of course not need to address the forced speech argument.
The Commission might reasonably omit discussion of forced
speech when that issue was not even raised, which means that the
Commission had a reasonable, non-animus-based reason for
including that discussion in the case involving Phillips but not in
the cases involving Jack. But if there was a reasonable explanation
for the Commission’s action, then the Court should not have
treated this difference as an additional reason to attribute animus
to the Commission.137 The Court suggested that “[a]t the time,
state law also afforded shopkeepers some latitude to decline to
create specific messages the storekeeper considered offensive.”138
But the Commission should not be accused of bias simply because
it applied state law in good faith, exempting individuals who
refused to create objects containing specific, offensive messages
but not exempting individuals who refused to create objects that
did not contain messages at all, much less offensive ones.
The Court offered another reason to believe that the
Commission had an anti-religious bias. The Commission had found
speech to have been involved in one case but not the other.139 Yet,
Jack had requested cakes with particular words and symbols,140
and Phillips had refused to make a cake even before any words or
symbols had been discussed.141 For all Phillips knew, Craig and
Mullins would not even have wanted a cake with words or symbols
. . racist or homophobic messages.”).
137. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (“[W]e infer
discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any
other explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on
impermissible considerations.”).
138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
139. See id. at 1730 (“The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ case could
reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether
speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be
distinguished.”).
140. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
141. See Brief for Petitioners at 12, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“Craig
and Mullins did not specify whether they wanted words or designs on their
wedding cake . . . .”).
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or even one that looked like a traditional wedding cake.142
Suppose that a customer saw one of the cakes that Jack had
requested in a bakery window. Next to it was a sheet cake with
flowers on it. Might a reasonable person suggest that Jack’s cake
was communicating a particular message while the other cake was
not? It would seem difficult to miss the disapproval conveyed by
Jack’s cake and difficult to impute a particular conveyed message
by the sheet cake. Because a sheet cake without words or symbols
“lack[s] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the
editorial page of a newspaper,”143 it would be reasonable to
differentiate such a cake from Jack’s cake.
Perhaps, though, baking a sheet cake (or selling one that has
already made) for a wedding should at least be treated as
expressive conduct.144 But someone who provided a sheet cake
without symbols or writing for a same-sex wedding would not
thereby be expressing a particular message—one would not even
know whether the baker even knew that it was for a wedding.145
But if that is so, then the Commission might rightly believe “that
the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it
warrants protection under O’Brien.”146 The Court has “rejected the
142. Phillips might have had a suspicion about what Craig and Mullins might
want, but Phillips did not bother to find out. Cf. id. at 22
Evidence indicates that Craig and Mullins intended to ask Phillips to
design ‘a rainbow-layered [wedding] cake’ for them. In fact, that is the
very cake that another cake artist later created for their wedding.
Given the rainbow’s status as the preeminent symbol of gay pride,
Craig and Mullins’s wedding cake undeniably expressed support for
same-sex marriage.
143. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad.& Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
144. See Brief for Petitioners at 23, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“Phillips’s
creation of custom wedding cakes at least qualifies as a form of expressive
conduct.”).
145. Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66
An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the
law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing
its disapproval of the military, all the law school’s interview rooms are
full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they
would rather interview someplace else.
146. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
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view that “conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”147
Further, even if it were known that the baker had understood that
the cake would be used for a wedding, that would not justify
imputing a view about the wedding to the baker, since the baker
might be providing the cake so as to abide by the
antidiscrimination law rather than because he approves of the
wedding.148
There was ample reason for the Civil Rights Commission to
treat Jack’s cake as implicating speech and Phillip’s refusal to
make any cake as not implicating speech, because for all Phillips
knew the requested cake would have been indistinguishable from
a cake that might have been served on any occasion. Suppose,
though, that the Commission erred when treating Jack’s cake as
expressive but not saying the same thing about the cake that
Phillips refused to bake (even if it might merely have been a sheet
cake with flowers). Even so, the Court went a step farther and
imputed anti-religious bias to the Commission because it
distinguished the cakes for First Amendment purposes.149 Here,
too, such an imputation is inappropriate when there is a
reasonable, nonbiased explanation for such differential treatment,
even if ultimately the Commission should have decided these
matters differently.
The Court imputed animus to the Commission for yet another
reason. The Commission had approved the ALJ’s finding that the
bakers who had refused to bake the requested cake for Jacks were
147. Id. at 65–66 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
148. Cf. id. at 65 (“We have held that high school students can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits
because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.” (citing
Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250 (1990))). Apparently, Justice Thomas has a different reading of Rumsfeld. Cf.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Colorado
Court of Appeals was wrong to conclude that Phillips’ conduct was not expressive
because a reasonable observer would think he is merely complying with
Colorado's public-accommodations law. This argument would justify any law that
compelled protected speech. And, this Court has never accepted it.”).
149. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1730 (2018) (“The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ case could
reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether
speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be
distinguished.”).
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justified because the requested cake was “offensive,”150 whereas
the Commission did not suggest that the cake requested of Phillips
was also offensive. The Colorado Court of Appeals distinguished
the Phillips case and the Jack cases by noting that “the Division
found
that
the
bakeries . . . refuse[d]
the
patron’s
request . . . because of the offensive nature of the requested
message.”151 Such a statement might mean that the message on
the cake (the words and symbols) was objectively offensive or it
might mean that the bakers themselves found the words and
symbols offensive. If the intermediate appellate court was saying
the former, then the court was committing error. “[T]he difference
in treatment of these two instances cannot be based on the
government’s own assessment of offensiveness,”152 because “it is
not . . . the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall
be offensive.”153
Suppose, however, that the intermediate appellate court was
simply saying that the bakers found the requested symbols or
writing offensive and thus were refusing to bake such cakes for
anyone.154 Phillips was saying that he found it offensive to make a
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins, even though he might have
made the same cake for someone else.155 If the intermediate
150. See id. at 1731 (“In those cases, the court continued, there was no
impermissible discrimination because ‘the Division found that the
bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the offensive nature of
the requested message.’”).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762–64 (2017)). It is simply
unclear whether the Court’s pronouncement has any implications for application
of the Miller obscenity standard which requires a determination of “whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
154. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring)
Jack requested them to make a cake (one denigrating gay people and
same-sex marriage) that they would not have made for any customer.
In refusing that request, the bakers did not single out Jack because of
his religion, but instead treated him in the same way they would have
treated anyone else—just as CADA requires.
155. See id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he same-sex couple in this case
requested a wedding cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex
couple.”).
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appellate court was suggesting that the bakers viewed the Jack
cakes, themselves, as offensive (and they would not make them for
anyone) but that Phillips did not view the cake itself as offensive
(because he would have made it for a different-sex couple), then
the intermediate appellate court does not seem to be guilty of bias.
Or, if the Commission is guilty of bias by suggesting that Phillips
did not view the cake itself as offensive because he would not have
objected to making it for a different-sex couple, then the Court also
seems to be accusing Justices Kagan and Breyer of bias.156
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court concluded: “The outcome of
cases like this in other circumstances must await further
elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that
these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue
disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an
open market.”157 It is of course true that the jurisprudence will
have to be worked out in the courts. However, due respect for
sincerely held beliefs may require giving weight to a whole host of
beliefs about the offensiveness of providing goods or services to
particular people.158 Giving weight to such beliefs need not subject
gay persons in particular to various indignities.159 Different people
might find it offensive to provide goods or services to individuals of
various races, nationalities, religions, etcetera.160 The Court seems
to be opening the door to the imposition of indignities on a whole
host of groups.
Justice Gorsuch argues that the bakers’ refusal of Jack’s
request and Phillips’s refusal of Craig and Mullins’s request were

156. See id. (Kagan, J. concurring) (making this distinction).
157. Id. at 1732.
158. Cf. id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that religious beliefs
about the offensiveness of providing wedding cakes to particular types of people
must be given weight).
159. See id. at 1732 (discussing the need to resolve these disputes without
“subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an
open market”).
160. See Andrea A. Curcio, Addressing Barriers to Cultural Sensibility
Learning: Lessons from Social Cognition Theory, 15 NEV. L.J. 537, 549 (2015)
(“[A] significant portion of Americans have biases based upon a wide range of
cultural
factors
such
as race, ethnicity, religion, gender,
age,
and
sexual orientation.”).
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comparable.161 Jack was refused service “because the cakes he
sought were offensive to [the bakers’] own moral convictions.”162
The bakers claimed that they “didn’t deny Mr. Jack service because
of his religious faith,”163 offering two distinct reasons to support
that claim: (1) “they treated Mr. Jack as they would have anyone
who requested a cake with similar messages, regardless of their
religion,” and (2) “they were happy to provide religious persons
with other cakes expressing other ideas.”164 But, Justice Gorsuch
believed, Phillips could have made the analogous claim.165 (1) “Mr.
Phillips testified without contradiction that he would have refused
to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage for any customer,
regardless of his or her sexual orientation,”166 and (2) “Mr. Phillips
offered to make other baked goods for the couple, including cakes
celebrating other occasions.”167 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch argued
that “the two cases share all legally salient features.”168 The
customer was affected the same way in both cases: “bakers refused
service to persons who bore a statutorily protected trait (religious
faith or sexual orientation). But in both cases the bakers refused
service intending only to honor a personal conviction.”169
Yet, Justice Gorsuch’s gloss obscures some possibly important
facets. Jack requested a cake with particular words and symbols
but did not request it for a particular occasion.170 The bakers
responded that they would make cakes with other religious words
and symbols, which might have been appropriate for whatever
161. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1735 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (concluding that the customer
received the same result in both cases).
162. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
163. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
165. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (discussing a lack of distinction in the
two sets of facts).
166. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
167. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
168. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
169. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
170. See id. at 1734–35 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing how William
Jack approached three separate bakers asking them to prepare cakes with anti
same-sex messages).
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occasion Jack wished to celebrate. Phillips refused to make any
cake celebrating a same-sex union, so his offer to make other cakes
for a different occasion would not be of much help.171 Indeed, it is a
little surprising that Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion
rather than an opinion concurring in the judgment. The
Masterpiece Cakeshop Court suggested that it would be a violation
of the Colorado antidiscrimination law for a baker to refuse to bake
any cake for a same-sex wedding,172 and Justice Gorsuch basically
confirmed that Phillips would not bake any cake for a same-sex
wedding.173 But if indeed the Court is correct about Colorado law
and Justice Gorsuch is correct about Phillips’s policy, then the
Court should have affirmed the decision below174 as harmless
error,175 while chastising the Commission member(s) for having
made inappropriate comments.176
Suppose that Brittany comes into a bakery because she wants
a wedding cake to be made. She will make all decisions about the
cake because her betrothed, Lee, is out of the country (or otherwise
171. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1735 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (discussing Mr. Phillips interactions
with Craig and Mullins and his offer to make the cakes celebrating something
other than a same-sex wedding).
172. See id. at 1728 (discussing how a total denial of service would likely go
beyond “any protected rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the
general public”).
173. See id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Whatever one may think of
the statements in historical context, I see no reason why the comments of one or
two Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to sell a wedding
cake to Craig and Mullins.”).
174. See id. at 1752 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[S]ensible application of
CADA to a refusal to sell any wedding cake to a gay couple should occasion
affirmance of the Colorado Court of Appeals' judgment. I would so rule.”).
175. Cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983)
Supervisory power to reverse a conviction is not needed as a remedy
when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since by definition,
the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted
error. Further, in this context, the integrity of the process carries less
weight, for it is the essence of the harmless error doctrine that a
judgment may stand only when there is no “reasonable possibility that
the [practice] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”
(quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87 (1963).
176. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1749 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[N]or do the comments by one or
two members of one of the four decision-making entities considering this case
justify reversing the judgment below.”).
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occupied). The baker might refuse to make the cake under these
conditions, believing in the importance of talking to both of the
parties so that just the right cake could be made.177 But another
baker might be willing to make such a cake without consulting
both parties.
Suppose that the requested cake is not to have writing or
symbols. It is to be a traditional, three-tiered cake178 but there are
to be no people on it, e.g., a bride and groom.179 The baker makes
the cake and delivers it to the appropriate place on the appropriate
day.
What would this cake communicate? Justice Gorsuch writes
that a “wedding cake without words conveys a message. Words or
not and whatever the exact design, it celebrates a wedding, and if
the wedding cake is made for a same-sex couple it celebrates a
same-sex wedding.”180 In the hypothesized case, the traditional
wedding cake might be taken to communicate “celebration,”181
although one cannot tell whether this celebration involves a
same-sex wedding or a different-sex wedding unless one knows
whether Lee is a man or a woman.
Consider a different-sex couple, Carla and David, who
commission a three-tier, rainbow wedding cake. Here, the wedding
cake is for a different-sex couple and thus (according to Justice
Gorsuch) celebrates a different-sex wedding, although Phillips
177. See id. at 1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Phillips is an active participant in the wedding celebration. He sits
down with each couple for a consultation before he creates their custom wedding
cake. He discusses their preferences, their personalities, and the details of their
wedding to ensure that each cake reflects the couple who ordered it.”).
178. See Haley Holik, You Have the Right to Speak by Remaining Silent: Why
a State Sanction to Create a Wedding Cake Is Compelled Speech, 28 REGENT U.L.
REV. 299, 303 (2016) (discussing the tradition of a three-tiered wedding cake).
179. See Laura Krugman Ray, From the Bench to the Screen: The Woman
Judge in Film, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 681, 713 (2012) (discussing “the wedding cake,
complete with bride and groom”).
180. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
181. See id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When a couple contacts a
bakery for a wedding cake, the product they are seeking is a cake
celebrating their wedding—not a cake celebrating heterosexual weddings or
same-sex weddings.”).
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might have refused to make the cake because he believed it
communicated support for same-sex couples.182 Indeed, Carla and
David might have ordered such a cake because they wished to
communicate solidarity with same-sex couples who wished to
marry, although they also might have ordered such a cake because
they thought rainbow cakes were pretty.
An individual who saw the rainbow cake in a bakery window
might reasonably assume that the cake was communicating
support for same-sex couples (even if in fact it was ordered because
the couple believed that it would be pretty). This kind of cake might
be thought analogous to the cakes requested by Jack in that those
looking at the cakes might infer a message without knowing who
ordered it, although the messages themselves are quite different.
Both the rainbow cake and the cakes ordered by Jack are
distinguishable from the possibly nondescript cake that Craig and
Mullins might have requested.183
A separate issue involves which of the cake-baking refusals
either implicates the Colorado antidiscrimination law or triggers
First Amendment protections. That issue should be resolved in
light of a variety of factors. But it is a disservice to all to claim that
there are no “legally salient” differences between a baker’s refusal
to make a particular cake for anyone and a baker’s refusal to make
a particular cake for some people even though he would have made
that identical cake for someone else.184

182. See Brief for Petitioners at 22, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), 2017 WL 3913762 (“Given the rainbow’s
status as the preeminent symbol of gay pride, Craig and Mullins's wedding cake
undeniably expressed support for same-sex marriage.”); see also Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that Phillips would
not create a wedding cake celebrating a same-sex marriage for any customer).Of
course, using Justice Gorsuch’s analysis, such a cake would not be celebrating a
same-sex marriage because it was made for a different-sex wedding. Cf. id. at
1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that a wedding cake “celebrates a
wedding, and if the wedding cake is made for a same-sex couple it celebrates a
same-sex wedding”).
183. Justice Gorsuch does not seem to appreciate this. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1738–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he Commission
accepted the bakers’ view that the specific cakes Mr. Jack requested conveyed a
message offensive to their convictions and allowed them to refuse service. Having
done that there, it must do the same here.”).
184. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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III. The Future Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop

The Masterpiece Cakeshop holding is quite narrow, which
means that the decision might not play a significant role in the
development of the subsequent caselaw.185 However, the opinion
includes numerous implicit and explicit suggestions about which
factors might be relevant and how those factors might be treated
in other cases involving claims of conscience.186 Further, some of
the implicit doctrinal claims, if accepted, would have important
implications in a variety of areas. It is thus important to explore
some of the implicit and explicit arguments made in the opinion.
A. What Constitutes Bias?
There are several ways to read the Masterpiece Cakeshop
analysis. On some readings, the opinion changes nothing. On
others, however, there may be great changes in what counts as a
neutral and respectful treatment of parties.
Suppose that the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court was not
confident that Phillips had refused to provide any baked goods for
Craig and Mullins, possibly interpreting the offer to provide other
baked goods (instead of a wedding cake) as intended to apply to
goods for the reception rather than as an offer to sell baked goods
for some other occasion.187 Suppose further that the “despicable”
comment along with some of the other comments about religion
and the marketplace sufficed to establish bias.188 In that event, the
Commission decision might be thought appropriately vacated
because of bias, and the rest of the opinion discussing factors that
might be relevant189 could be dismissed as “random
185. See id. at 1732 (holding that the ruling of the Commission must be
invalidated).
186. See id. at 1731–32 (discussing conscience-based objections).
187. See id. at 1724 (describing how Phillips offered several times to bake
goods for any other type of event).
188. See id. at 1734 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he only reason the
Commission seemed to supply for its discrimination was that it found Mr.
Phillips’s religious beliefs ‘offensive.’”).
189. See id. at 1723–24 (discussing the lack of neutrality in the Colorado Civil
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judicial musing.”190 However, the decision need not be taken that
way at all.
The Court suggested that the “treatment of the other cases
and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted as being
inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved, quite
apart from whether the cases should ultimately be
distinguished.”191 Because such an interpretation would be
reasonable even if in fact incorrect, bias could be imputed.192 But
this is a very low bar for imputing bias.
Consider the cakes. One had writing and symbols on it while
the other might have been a “generic cake.”193 The Court itself has
compared cases where one case but not the other has “the
expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page
of a newspaper.”194 No one denied the expressive quality of Jack’s
requested cakes,195 whereas it might be much more difficult to
attribute a particular message to a generic cake. But if that is so
and it is nonetheless reasonable to impute bias, then many
commission or judicial decisions will be subject to a charge of bias.
Suppose that a three-tiered cake were used for a birthday
celebration. Would such a cake nonetheless communicate
celebration of a wedding?196 Would the cake’s message change if it
had “Happy Birthday” written on the cake?197
Rights Commission decision).
190. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration &
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623,
1643 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (saying “[n]o good can come
of such random judicial musing”).
191. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1730 (2018).
192. See id. (“In short, the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious
objection did not accord with its treatment of these other objections.”).
193. See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text (discussing Brittany
and Lee’s generic cake).
194. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
195. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (“[T]he Civil Rights
Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that
conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text.”).
196. See id. at 1743 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“If an average person walked
into a room and saw a white, multi-tiered cake, he would immediately know that
he had stumbled upon a wedding.”).
197. See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 58, at 243 n.27 (discussing the
“communicative content . . . found in ‘happy birthday’ in frosting”).
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Even if one accepts that a traditional, three-tiered wedding
cake has inherent symbolism,198 that does not mean that a generic
sheet cake used for a wedding would have that same symbolism.
Just as cupcakes presumably do not have the inherent symbolism
of a wedding cake, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s refusal to provide such
baked goods for a same-sex couple notwithstanding,199 a generic
sheet cake would not have that inherent meaning.
If the Colorado intermediate appellate court was simply trying
to follow Supreme Court precedent because the generic cake would
require additional explanation for an observer to know its meaning
while Jack’s requested cake would require no additional
explanation,200 then it is difficult to understand why animus may
reasonably be imputed to the court making that differentiation.
Further, the Court has suggested in other contexts that when there
is a charge of bias, the question that should be asked is whether
there is a reasonable non-invidious explanation for what was done
in which case animus would not be presumed.201
After the Court’s issuance of its Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion,
one hopes that fewer commission members will comment about
whether they approve of particular religious beliefs. But if that is
so, then the Court’s discussion of other bias indicators will be more
important because it will be much more unlikely that there will be
a “smoking gun”202 like the commissioner’s “despicable”
comments.203
198. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(discussing “the inherent symbolism in wedding cakes”).
199. See id. at 1726 (discussing the shop’s policy of not selling cakes for
same-sex weddings).
200. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 (“The fact that such explanatory speech is
necessary is strong evidence that the conduct at issue here is not so inherently
expressive that it warrants protection under O’Brien.”).
201. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (“[W]e infer
discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any
other explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on
impermissible considerations.”).
202. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226 (1988) (discussing “the
‘smoking gun’ of the memorandum or some other direct evidence of
discrimination”).
203. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1729 (2018) (“To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces
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The Court suggested that the Commission’s willingness to find
that the bakers refusing to bake Jack’s requested cakes did not
violate the antidiscrimination law coupled with the commission’s
unwillingness to treat the Phillips case in the same way
constituted bias, even though the bakers were objecting to the
wording and images on the cake while Phillips was not.204 But the
Court’s suggestion may be taken to suggest that a commission’s
treating different cases differently205 may nonetheless reasonably
be viewed as reflecting bias.
The commissioners’ comments may have provided enough of a
basis for a finding of bias that the Court’s other, more questionable
bases for attribution of bias should be considered harmless error.
But many cases in the future will likely not include prejudicial
comments, and the Court’s suggestion that the application of
current law is itself a basis for attributing bias is regrettable and
must be disavowed at the earliest opportunity.
B. Speech
An important issue raised in Masterpiece Cakeshop involves
the conditions, if any, under which a refusal to provide goods or
services constitutes speech.206 The Court mentioned Phillips’s
“belief that ‘to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates
something that directly goes against the teachings of the Bible,
would have been a personal endorsement and participation in the
ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.’”207 While
the Court did not say whether Phillips’s making such a cake would
in fact constitute compelled speech,208 the Court did comment:
of rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct
ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely
rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”).
204. See id. at 1730 (“For these reasons, the Court cannot avoid the conclusion
that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the
Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.”).
205. See id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[A] proper basis for
distinguishing the cases was available—in fact, was obvious.”).
206. See id. at 1723 (discussing the free speech difficulties in this case).
207. Id. at 1724.
208. See id. at 1726 (“[Phillips] first asserted that applying CADA in a way
that would require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his
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The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons
who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of
its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an
instructive example, however, of the proposition that the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can
deepen our understanding of their meaning.209

Regrettably, the Court gave little direction about whether or
why this case constitutes a new context or in what ways our
understanding of speech could or should be deepened.210 Many
individuals may sincerely believe that certain actions would send
a message that they are unwilling to send whether or not a
reasonable person would infer that such a message was being
sent.211 If the sincere belief that performance of a particular action
would send a message suffices to make the action trigger First
Amendment guarantees, then the state may well have a very
difficult time requiring individuals to perform or, perhaps, refrain
from performing a whole host of actions. For example, individuals
might object to paying (some of) their taxes lest they be understood
to be sending a message in favor of an immoral war.212 In any
event, the Court has expressly rejected that one’s sincerely
believing that the performance of an action would constitute
sending a message will alone suffice to make such an action speech
or even expressive conduct.213 Even one’s intending to send a
First Amendment right to free speech by compelling him to exercise his artistic
talents to express a message with which he disagreed.”).
209. Id. at 1723.
210. See id. at 1726 (discussing the constitutional speech claim Phillips made
before a state administrative law judge).
211. But see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” (citing Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974))).
212. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245, 268 (1934)
(“The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse
to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or
in furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or
immoral.”).
213. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (failing to allow
for such a subjective approach to First Amendment analysis).
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message by performing an action is not alone enough to make such
an action speech or expressive conduct.214
The Court does not provide a helpful way to limit what
constitutes speech. Consider Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc.,215 which involved law schools who did not
want to host military recruiters at a time when there was a ban on
gays serving in the military.216 The Rumsfeld Court rejected that
the law schools were being compelled to speak by hosting the
military, reasoning that “accommodating the military’s message
does not affect the law schools’ speech, because the schools are not
speaking when they host interviews and recruiting
receptions.”217 But the law schools believed that they were being
forced to speak, even though “a law school’s decision to allow
recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.”218
To make matters more confusing, the law schools did speak in
an inherently expressive way by posting the time and place that
the recruiters would meet with job-seekers.219 However, the Court
reasoned, the law schools accommodating the military recruiters
“does not affect the law schools’ speech,”220 in part because the law
schools were not themselves restricted in what they “may say
about the military’s policies”221 and in part because the law schools’
hosting the military (including saying where and when the
recruiters would meet with students) did not constitute an
endorsement of the military policy. “[S]tudents can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school
permits because legally required to do so.”222

214. See id. (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea.”).
215. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
216. Id. at 51 (discussing Congress’s response to law schools’ restriction of
military recruiters’ access to their campuses).
217. Id. at 64.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 61 (discussing emails and notices on notice boards).
220. Id. at 64.
221. Id. at 65.
222. Id.

1002

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 963 (2019)

Even if making a cake is inherently expressive,223 making a
cake need not express the baker’s own view about the marriage or
the suitability of the parties for each other. The baker can post
signs that he does not approve of same-sex marriage if he is
worried that the public might misunderstand his view.224 In any
event, the public at large would presumably understand that the
baker would not be giving his imprimatur of approval just by
baking a cake if indeed he were legally required to do so.225
In subsequent cases, the Court will have to decide which
refusals to provide goods or services are expressive and therefore
triggering First Amendment protections. While the Court rejects
that the First Amendment requires “all purveyors of goods and
services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious
reasons . . . [to] be allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or
services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,’”226 the
Court nowhere provides any way to limit the (possible) speech
rights implicated and seems to reject one of the possible limiting
principles.227 Many commercial entities might believe that
providing goods or services for a wedding they do not support is
offensive and communicates condonation or endorsement,228 even
223. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1742 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“[C]reating and designing custom wedding cakes . . . is expressive.”).
224. See Andrew Jensen, Compelled Speech, Expressive Conduct, and
Wedding Cakes: A Commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 147, 161 (2018)
(“[A] baker could declare his moral opposition to same-sex unions by placing
a sign in the shop window or stating his view to customers, while still baking
cakes for those weddings.”).
225. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Court of
Appeals . . . reasoned that an outside observer would think that Phillips was
merely complying with Colorado's public-accommodations law, not expressing a
message.”).
226. Id. at 1728–29.
227. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad.& Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65
(2006) (discussing how the analysis changes when the conduct is required by law).
228. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims
of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 249–50 (2015) (“Every objecting baker,
florist, and photographer who refuses to provide services for a same-sex ceremony
resists sending a particular message, namely, ‘I endorse or condone same-sex
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if they do not wish to send a message that the participants in the
wedding are second-class citizens.229 The Court neither provides or
even suggests a way to distinguish among such claims so that only
certain providers would be able to refuse to sell their goods or
services without violating antidiscrimination laws. On the
contrary, the Court’s attribution of bias to the Commission when
it accepted one offensiveness defense but not another illustrates
that attempts to justify preferring some refusals over others would
be viewed “with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye.”230
C. Free Exercise
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court suggests that Phillips’s free
exercise rights were violated.231 That violation involved the
commission’s allegedly having failed “to proceed in a manner
neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”232 But
the decision did not “vindicate[] Phillips’ right to free exercise,”
where that would be understood to mean that Phillips would be
immunized from prosecution for violating the Colorado
antidiscrimination law.233 Indeed, were Phillips to refuse to sell
any baked goods now to a same-sex couple celebrating their
weddings.’ For them, creating a cake or taking a picture . . . conveys approval of
that union, an approval they do not wish to bestow.”); Angela C. Carmella, When
Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious Reasons: Drawing Lines Between
“Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral Complicity, 69 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 1593, 1607 (2017) (“They argue that to require them to provide wedding
goods and services to same-sex couples forces them to endorse, even celebrate,
same-sex marriage in violation of their right not to be coerced to speak the
government's message and their right to religious conscience.”).
229. See Kathleen A. Brady, The Disappearance of Religion from Debates
About Religious Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1093, 1113 (2017)
(“Conservative believers do not necessarily think that they are sending such
a message [i.e., that gays and lesbians are not full and equal members of society]
when they refuse to provide wedding services to same-sex couples.”).
230. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).
231. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1724 (2018) (“[T]he Commission's actions here violated the Free Exercise
Clause.”).
232. Id. at 1731.
233. Justice Thomas seems to obscure this point. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Phillips rightly prevails on
his free-exercise claim . . . .”).
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marriage, the Court implied that he could be prosecuted both
because a baker’s blanket refuse to provide such products was
illegal before234 and because same-sex marriage is now recognized
in Colorado when it was not before.235
Nonetheless, some parts of the opinion suggest that there may
be changes to free exercise jurisprudence. Justice Gorsuch may be
suggesting that Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith236 should be revisited.237 Other
justices have suggested the same thing in other decisions in the
past.238 Even if the Court does not reconsider Smith, however,
Masterpiece Cakeshop might be interpreted to undermine Smith in
important ways.
Smith suggests that “the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).’”239 However, the Supreme Court has also made clear
that “the government . . . cannot act in a manner that passes
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs
and practices.”240 In the case before the Masterpiece Cakeshop
Court, the Commission was “obliged under the Free Exercise
Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of
Phillips’ religious beliefs.”241
234. See id. at 1728.
235. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (discussing the change in
same-sex marriage law since Phillips refused to sell a cake to Craig and Mullins).
236. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), as
recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
237. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Smith remains controversial in
many quarters.”).
238. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 565 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“I believe that it is essential for the Court to reconsider its holding
in Smith . . . .”).
239. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)).
240. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
241. Id.
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That obligation to proceed neutrally must be unpacked. The
Commission treated the cake-baking refusals differently because
Jack’s requested cakes had a clear message, whereas Phillips did
not even wait to find out whether Craig and Mullins’s cake would
have a clear message.242 For all that Phillips knew, the cake that
they were requesting would be indistinguishable from any number
of cakes that might be requested to celebrate any number of
occasions.243 If treating these different kinds of refusals differently
nonetheless constituted a discriminatory application of the
Colorado antidiscrimination law,244 then free exercise rights may
become quite robust (even if Smith is not overruled), because
recognition of any exceptions will require recognizing multiple
exceptions.245
Consider Sherbert v. Verner,246 which involved whether the
state of South Carolina could deny unemployment benefits to an
individual who could not work on Saturday because of her religious
beliefs.247 The Sherbert Court held that the denial of
unemployment benefits was a violation of free exercise
guarantees.248
Suppose that a different South Carolinian is precluded from
working on Saturday because she cannot get childcare for her
242. See id. 1732–33 (Kagan, J., concurring) (stating that the Commission
determined the differences between the two cases were that Jack’s refusals were
based on the offensive nature of the cake’s message).
243. See id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing that Phillips withheld
“the full and equal enjoyment” of his business on the basis of sexual orientation).
244. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he discriminatory
application of Colorado’s public-accommodations law is enough on its own to
violate Phillips’ rights.”).
245. See id. at 1727 (arguing that a long list of exceptions would result in a
possible “community-wide stigma”).
246. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
247. See id. at 399–400 (“When she was unable to obtain other employment
because from conscientious scruples, she would not take Saturday work, she filed
a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act.”); see also id. at 401 (“The appellee
Employment Security Commission, in administrative proceedings under the
statute, found that appellant’s restriction upon her availability for Saturday work
brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who
fail, without good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered’ . . . .”).
248. See id. at 410 (“Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to
abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.”).
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children on that day, and she has a moral (and legal) duty to make
sure that her children have proper supervision.249 Would the
recognition of Sherbert’s right to receive unemployment
compensation also require the state to give unemployment
compensation to the parent who is trying to fulfill her parental
duties?
The answer might depend upon whether religious duties are
viewed as on a par with non-religious duties or, instead, as
requiring more protection than non-religious duties.250 If they are
on a par, then just as the State cannot punish someone for fulfilling
her duty to observe the Sabbath, a state cannot punish someone
for fulfilling her duty to supervise her children.251 But even if
religious duties are preferred, it would be unsurprising for many
to believe that they have a religious duty to make sure that their
children are adequately supervised.252
So, too, it is unclear whether the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court
considers what is religiously offensive as equivalent to what is
“offensive to . . . secular convictions,”253 although the Court
cautions against “elevat[ing] one view of what is offensive over
another,”254 at least in part because “the role of the State or its

249. See Mark Strasser, Free Exercise and Substantial Burdens Under
Federal Law, 94 NEB. L. REV. 633, 653 (2016) (comparing “those who ‘chose’ not to
work for compelling reasons such as the need to be home at certain times to care
for children or to avoid working on the Sabbath”).
250. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
[T]he implications of the present decision are far more troublesome
than its apparently narrow dimensions would indicate at first
glance . . . . [T]he State, in other words, must single out for financial
assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though
it denies such assistance to others whose identical behavior (in this
case, inability to work no Saturdays) is not religiously motivated.
251. See id. at 422–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining the concept of
constitutional neutrality).
252. See id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the presence of
religious motivation creates an exception for behavior that would generally not
be eligible for financial assistance).
253. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1735 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 1731.
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officials [is not] to prescribe what shall be offensive.”255 But if what
is morally offensive or, perhaps, what is offensive to conscience
(whether religious or secular) must be given an exemption if any
exemptions are granted (unless strict scrutiny can be met), then
Masterpiece Cakeshop may be signaling a new day with respect to
the kinds of exemptions that the state will have to grant to laws
(assuming that any exceptions are granted at all).256
D. Antidiscrimination Laws
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court affirmed that states can have
and enforce antidiscrimination laws.257 “It is unexceptional that
Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other
classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services
they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to
other members of the public.”258 However, the decision may well
bode poorly for the application of antidiscrimination laws to
refusals to provide goods or services, as long as those refusals
qualify as communicating a message.259 Depending upon how the
Court delimits the kind of actions (or refusals) that are treated as
communicating a message, this limitation on antidiscrimination
law
may
create
“the
gaping exception that
260
nearly swallows the rule.”
If a commercial entity is viewed as
communicating a message whenever it refuses to provide a good or
service because of a sincere desire not to support a particular

255. Id.
256. See id. at 1745–46 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because Phillips’ conduct
(as described by the Colorado Court of Appeals) was expressive, Colorado’s
public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law withstands strict
scrutiny.”).
257. See id. at 1728 (implying that states can enact and enforce
antidiscrimination laws).
258. Id.
259. See id. (“In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a line
where the customers’ right to goods and services became a demand for him to
exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message, a message he
could not express in a way consistent with his religious beliefs.”).
260. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal.by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1646 (2014).
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practice or group, then almost any business might qualify for an
exemption.261
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court cited Matal v. Tam262 with
approval.263 The Matal Court suggested, “[S]peech that demeans
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or
any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our
free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express
‘the thought that we hate.’”264 The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court’s
having pointed to a section of the Matal opinion containing the
passage above is alarming. The Court may be suggesting that
various kinds of refusals to sell products or services qualify as
speech and that hateful speech must be permitted, which means
that antidiscrimination laws will be easy to circumvent by talking
about why one’s refusal to serve particular individuals (of the
wrong kind) in the marketplace constitutes speech.265
Many people understand that a refusal to provide goods and
services is insulting,266 demeaning,267 and might be taken to mean
that the person refused is not a full and equal citizen.268 Further,
261. Mark Strasser, Speech, Association, Conscience, and the First
Amendment's Orientation, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 495, 530 (2014) (“[M]ost if not all
businesses would seem permitted to refuse to provide services so that they could
avoid sending an undesired message.”).
262. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
263. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1731 (2018) (“A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these
two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of
offensiveness.”).
264. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S.
644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
265. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1737–38 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (listing examples of what is considered neutral religious treatment).
266. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism, Democracy, and Deep Disagreement:
Decentralizing Baseline Disputes in the Law of Religious Liberty, 69 ALA. L. REV.
913, 967 (2018) (discussing the “insulting message conveyed by a refusal to
serve”).
267. Cf. Steven J. Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over
Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
1, 121 (2015) (“[I]t is demeaning to know that some providers
will refuse to serve you because of your identity . . . .”).
268. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (“Our society has come to
the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social
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lest there be any doubt in the would-be buyer’s mind about the
message communicated by the refusal to sell, the refusing seller
could make the message quite clear.
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court may be endorsing a kind of
equal opportunity discrimination.269 The government cannot
prescribe what is offensive and cannot “elevate[] one view of what
is offensive over another, . . . [which would] itself send[] a signal of
official disapproval . . . .”270 One person’s view of offensiveness
cannot be given greater weight than another’s, and “government
has no role in deciding or even suggesting whether . . . [a] ground
for . . . conscience-based
objection
is
legitimate
or
illegitimate.”271 Such an approach would suggest that granting one
exemption for offensiveness requires granting exemptions to
anyone who would be offended by entering into a commercial
transaction with a member of a particular group.272 A policy
implementing this approach could severely limit, if not “sound[] a
potential death knell[,] for a panoply of [antidiscrimination]
statutes.”273
IV. Conclusion
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court issued a narrow holding that
seemed to affirm free exercise rights while also affirming the right
of same-sex couples to marry.274 However, many of the implicit
claims about which factors are relevant and what roles those
factors may play in future cases implicating conscience suggest
that future decisions about these and related matters will be
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”).
269. Id.; cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“St. Paul has
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring
the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”).
270. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 1732 (“In this case the adjudication concerned a context that
may well be different going forward in the respects noted above.”).
273. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 628 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
274. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1723 (2018) (stating that this case presents difficult questions about
governmental entities’ authority to prevent discrimination and free speech).
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contentious and will lead to the kind of society that many might
prefer not to have.275
The Court seems to open the door to discrimination against a
variety of groups on the basis of race, religion, orientation,
etcetera, as a matter of First Amendment guarantees.276
Individuals who in good conscience (whether religious or secular)
do not wish to condone or support a variety of groups may express
those sincere convictions in a way that will lead to a less civil
society for all. Even if the Court adopts a preferentialist view of
religious conscience (privileging religious conscience over secular
conscience), many individuals might sincerely claim that their
religious or spiritual beliefs require them not to do business with
any number of types of individuals, and the Court may have
provided a framework for immunizing actions based on such
beliefs.277
Masterpiece Cakeshop need not lead to such a dystopian result.
The decision may simply be viewed as involving a limited holding
that directs decisionmakers not to manifest prejudice towards any
of the parties before them.278 However, the decision may also be a
harbinger of decisions to come that will make society a less
welcoming place for everyone, regardless of race, religion,
orientation, gender, nationality, etc. One can only hope that the
Court will recognize where some lines of reasoning lead and do its
best to prevent adoption of interpretations and practices that are
insupportable as a matter of constitutional law or good public
policy.

275. See id. at 1732 (stating that future similar cases must be resolved
individually based on their context).
276. See id. (“The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First
Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral
towards religion.”).
277. See id. (stating that full and fair consideration must be given to religious
objections).
278. See id. (“Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker . . . .”).

